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STUDIA MATHEMATICA
BULGARICA
OPTIMIZATION OF ADVERTISING RESOURCES OVER
TIME: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
M. Ling, K. Lawler, N. McBain, A. Moscardini
Strategic behaviour has long been a crucial issue for modern corporations. To max-
imize potential profits and market share, firms are more than willing to invest in
sales promotion to boost long term manufacturing output. Knowing that the sales
of the firm not only respond to own advertising budgets, but also depend upon
rivals’ advertising strategies, oligopolistic firms form part, therefore of a continuous
race with reference to non-price competition. Efficient use of investment resources
is crucial for business operations and long term strategic success. This paper aims
to investigate the key issue of optimization of strategic advertising outlays. By us-
ing mathematical modelling techniques, strategic linkages between rival companies
are identified and advertising impacts explained. Since advertising influences can
persist through time, our discussion extends to explore this fundamental point by
constructing a more advanced model to examine into the problems of optimization
over time. Empirical data is used to test the predictive power of these models
and assess relative efficiencies. All in all, this paper intends to highlight the im-
portance of continuous strategic advertising investment and consequently provides
comprehensive insights into the impact of modern advertising functions over time.
Keywords: Strategic advertising, advertising model, advertising function, optimisation.
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1 Introduction
Strategic conduct is an important issue for competitive oligopolised industry. Since the
1970s, the new industrial economics, has stressed the significance of game theory and
industrial case studies. Industrial economists such as Cowling & Waterson (1976) [12],
Clarke & Davis (1982) [9], Dixit (1982) [16] & Tirole (1988) [42] stress the role of strategic
conduct and place relatively less emphasis on market structure. According to the SCP
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paradigm, the central methodology for the theory of industrial organisation, conduct is
strategically implemented to enhance performance under specific market structures.1
Needham (1978) believes that there is a strong systematic relationship between in-
dustrial structure and conduct of a firm. However, Rumelt (1991) [35] indicates that
the number of players in an industry only slightly affects the variance of performance
outcomes between firms.2
Since the market structure of an industry cannot reflect performance variations,
analysis of performance differences may rely on the substructures of industry. How-
ever, due to geographical advantages, some players may possess enormous monopoly
power. Hence, spatially speaking, the nature of competition is more complex than sim-
ply oligopoly models consider. Oligopoly varies in different market subregions. To ex-
plain the superior performance of market leaders and heterogeneity in performance for
others, the concept of strategic groups is employed, which was emphasised by Newman
(1978) [32], Caves and Proter (1977) [7], and Porter (1979) [33]. With significant per-
formance variations between players in the same industry, it is important to understand
the composition and nature of strategic groups in an industry. Amel & Rhoades (1988)
[1] examined strategic groups concerning portfolio specialisation in the US banking in-
dustry. Day et al. (1995) [14] used Data Envelopment Analysis to examine the source
of heterogeneous performance in the US brewing industry. In strategic groups analysis,
firms in a industry are classified with reference to distinctive performance characteristics
or business motives. If an established firm aims to increases market share by widening its
product portfolio. This means the firm intends to break down mobility barriers erected
by other strategic groups. Mobility barriers are difficult to break as each strategic group
possesses distinct market achievements which take time to establish and always relate to
forms of firm-specific assets.3 Advertising, is intrinsically an intangible asset nature, and
is commonly used by oligopolies to increase mobility barriers. This kind of intangible
asset is very important in industries crowded with differentiated products. Cable (1972)
[11] and Sawyer (1985) [36] discussed the issue of the suitability of effective advertising
strategies, believing that highly differentiated product markets are more desirable.4 This
1The methodology of analysing the linkages between market structure, actions taken by firms and
economic performance was first introduced by Mason (1939) [29]. Bain (1951) [2] produced more com-
prehensive generalisations regarding the SCP paradigm to explain economic relationships between profit
and levels of industrial concentration. However, the Austrian School criticises neo-classical assumptions
relating to the SCP paradigm and believes that barrier to new entry do not exist and competition is an
on-going process in a world of uncertainty and imperfect knowledge in changing business environments.
2Baumol (1982) [3] adopted the concept of constable rnarkets for the SCP methodology. His studies
suggest that barriers to entry and exit should not exist permanently and efficient performance is an au-
tomatic outcome of competition which does not rely on market structure. Moreover, the Chicago School
economists such as Stigler and Demsetz (1979) [15] believe that market competitive forces predominate
over morket structure in the long run.
3Ferguson & Ferguson (1994) [20] believe that entry to a specific strategic group is more difficult
then entry to a market (indvstry) as a whole since strategic groups possess high mobility bariiers which
persist over time. Day et al (1995) [14] suggests that the heterogeneity in performance across the US
brewing industry resulted from firm-specific assets (e.g. firm -specific barriers to imitation).
4Sawyer (1985) [36] also suggests that advertising is a signal rather than a cause of product differ-
entiation. The signalling feature of advertising were explored more thoroughly by Schmalensee (1978)
[38], Kihlstrom & Riordan (1984) [26] and Milgrom & Roberts (1986) [30].
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conduct variable is employed for several reasons: for example it can be used to reduce
competitiveness of rivals, strengthen market positions and limit the chances of success-
ful entry.5 Obviously, in a competitive market environment, the underlying reasons for
executing a conduct variable like advertising, is primarily strategically motivated. Since
advertising assets take time to accumulate momentum to influence sales and rivals re-
act correspondingly, the key problem for decision markers concerns the optimised use
of resources through time. The investigation of this issue is the primary thrust of this
paper.
2 Strategic advertising
In strategic terms, advertising delivers its inherent long run value to business as it helps
build a stock of “goodwill” over time. Empirical evidence from Ferguson (1974) [19] and
Cowling et al. (1975) [11] show that the advertising effect on sales persists longer than
the advertising period, producing a future demand effect despite the fact that its strength
fades gradually in time. Based on the fact that competition is a non-stop process and the
stock of “goodwill” is subject to depreciation, the efficient use of advertising investment
can affect strategic outcomes in different time periods. Observing both the decaying
nature of and constructive impacts of advertising, Ling et al. (1997) [28] consider an
advertising strategy based on a continuous advertising investment approach, to examine
the long and short run impacts of the strategic conduct in UK brewing. This empirical
study concludes that advertising produced no significant effects on the aggregate market
demand, because of the declining trend of beer sales in the UK. However, this study
provides a useful modelling technique for evaluating the impact of continuous advertising
for strategic groups.6 An important insight of these studies refers to the situation that
leading brewers do not necessarily employ advertising to block long run entry, but that
their advertising investment can motivate potential entrants to mimic their behaviour,
making new entrants’ short run promotional campaigns more costly.7 This perspective is
consistent with the Neo-Austrian view which treats advertising as delivering only short
run entry barriers. However, firm-specific barriers such as brand reputations take time to
establish. Even firms follow the Neo-Austrian thinking and ignore the existence of long
run barriers originated by advertising, every short run advertising investment outlay,
will eventually intensify the cumulative stock of “goodwill”. If long run outcomes can
be imagined to be short run effect in future, long run profit maximisation should not
substantially differ from each and every that in every single short run case. Conduct,
which seeks to create firm-specific assets or barriers to imitation (e.g. brand images and
perceived preferences) deliberately is called “strategic”. In a competitive market where
players may intentionally or unintentionally lean towards the short run “strategic” impact
of advertising in both the short and long run advertising performance can be disregarded.
5Bearne (1996) [4] provided ciitical comparisons between different school of thought regarding eco-
nomic consequences of advertising.
6UK brewers can be basically classified into national and regional groups. A similar definition of
strategic groups in brewing is put forward by Tramblay (1985).
7Day et al. (1995) [14] assert that attention to strategic group discussion needs to focus on strategic
leaders and the attempts of competing firms to mimic the behaviour of the “best practice frontier”.
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To place emphasis on the strategic impact of advertising through time this paper focuses
on continuous advertising investment as employed by key globalised oligopolists.8
Entry deterrence has long been an important strategic aim in oligopoly.9 Schmalensee
(1983) [39] introduced a striking new strategic facet to traditional theory, namely analy-
sis of post-entry reactions between incumbents and potential entrants. The idea was not
totally new since strategic outcomes for established firms and entrants relying on post-
entry games rather than current advertising outlays was discussed by Cubbin (1981).
However, the Schmalensee view received much attention and was further developed by
Tirole and Funderberg (1984) [21] with analysis of various circumstances focusing on a
taxonomy of business strategies. Moreover, cost components and barriers to entry are
inseparable issues for oligopoly markets. Geroski and Murfin (1991) [18] believe that
advertising limits entry prospects as the acquisition of huge advertising shares is costly.
This accord with the idea of product-specific sunk costs and replaces asset nature argu-
ments (Fugerson & Fugerson, 1994). Von Weizacker (1980) [44] suggests that advertising
is a sunk cost and hence the commitment of firms can be illustrated by heavy use of
advertising (Hay & Morris, 1991 [23]).10
3 Optimal advertising in oligopoly
Firms always try to avoid wasting resources. Only optimal use of advertising can sat-
isfy firms in channelling economically core resources towards creating real sales revenue.
Dorfman and Steiner (1954) [17] established the landmark theorem for the investigation
of static equilibrium relationships between optimal sales and optimal advertising levels.
Utilising the Lerner (1934) [27] Index of market power (P −MC/P = 1/elasticity) and
profit maximisation criteria (MC = MR), a profit maximisation advertising model is
established by the following procedures, by equating marginal cost (MC) and marginal
revenue (MR) for advertising:
MC =MR,
where MR =
P (∆Q)
∆A
and
MC =
∆Q(MCQ)
∆A
+ 1 = (P )
∆Q
∆A
8Apart from the Neo-Aust (ian argument, a lot of theorists mistreat advertising as a pure expenditure
item (marketing costs) and do not realise the implicit value deiived from consumer loyalty, improve
product images or reputation. Treatment of advertising as an investment item was discussed by Block
(1974) [5].
9Kaldor (1950) [24] pointed out that better market positions and barrier to entry result from adver-
tising. Comanor and Wilson (1974) [10] indicate higher levels of advertising lead to increased market
power. The empirical studies of Schmalensee (1978) [38] suggested that advertising might restrict new
entrants into the US ready-to-eat cereals markets between 1950 and 1970.
10However, others from the information school such as (Telser, 1965 [41]), (Hart & Clark, 1980 [22])
and (Kessides, 1991 [25]) argue that advertising cannot create barriers, bvt also reduces entry difficulties
by providing crucial information to consumers. Ravenscarfts (1983) [34] found that advertising created
a negative impact on assets.
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P : stands for unit price of product
Q : quality
A : advertising outlay
multiplying both side by
A
PQ
, we have
A
PQ
=
P −MC(EA)
P
,
where (EA) =
∆Q(A)
∆A(Q)
(1)
A
PQ
=
1
EQ
(EA)
Accordingly, Needham (1977) re-formulated profit maximisation behaviour using
both buyer and rival seller elasticities. Hence, the marginal revenue of advertising re-
garding rival reactions can be written as:
MRA = P
{∆Q
∆A
+
∆AR(∆Q)
∆A(∆AR)
}
multiplying the whole equation by
A
PQ
, yields:
∆Q(A)
∆A(Q)
+
∆AR(A)
∆A(AR)
.
(∆Q)(AR)
∆AR)(Q)
,
which is equivalent to [EA + EFFEAR], where, EA is the responsiveness of a quantity
change in demand of the firm to its own advertising outlay; EFF is the advertising
response of rivals to the firm’s own advertising. EAR is the quantity demand change for
a firm induced by rivals’ advertising.
While MCA =
MCQ[EA + ECCEAR]
P
+
A
PQ
. The resulting profit maximisation
model is shown as follows:
(2)
A
PQ
= [EA + EFFEAR]
1
EQ
The essence of this behavioural patterns of responses between rivals was further inves-
tigated by Schmalensee (1972) [37], who stressed the strategic advertising influences of
rival retaliation. The impact of retaliatory advertising responses is indicated by the
model given below:
(3)
A
PQ
=
1
EQ
[EA +R]
Explicit treatments relating to the estimate of the retaliatory rate (R) is important for
profit maximisation behaviour. Since the optimal advertising to sales ratio according to
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Dorfman and Steiner theorem depends on the relative ratio of advertising elasticity to
price elasticity of demand. However, this is purely based on the assumption that adver-
tising influences the advertised firm’s demand curve only and the external influences of
rivals demand are disregarded. According to the Schmalensee advertising models, then as
long as the retaliatory advertising response is known, the overall strength of advertising
elasticity and price elasticity can be estimated, as can the profit maximisation advertising
outlay. This opens up a new avenue for estimating optimal advertising outlays regarding
rival retaliations with strategic advertising. According to this modelling specification,
advertising investment is deliberately employed by firms to fulfil company objectives
such as market developments in new markets (new strategic groups) or, counter-attacks
to limit new entry. The crucial attainment of profit maximisation relies on the knowl-
edge domain of rival responses towards advertising games. Some theorists might argue
that advertising investment cannot be entirely competitive and retaliatory in essence in
product markets such as the UK brewing industry.
Nerlove and Arrow (1962) [31] introduced a new concept regarding the optimal
advertising-sales ratio by specifying the influence of advertising as the stock of good-
will. They argued that advertising influences will erode with time.
(4)
A
PQ
=
EA
EQ
.
1
r + d
This model indicates the optimal adjustment process towards the desirable level of ad-
vertising goodwill. Basically, the model is identical to the Dorfman and Steiner Theorem
apart from the bracketed terms. In equation (4), r stands for market rates for discounting
and d refers to the rate of depreciation of goodwill. Most importantly, the sum of the
bracketed terms implies that capital inputs decay with time. However, it is impossible
to deny that retaliatory advertising strategies exist in UK beer markets. Very often, tar-
get audiences see more than two different beer brands broadcasting TV advertisements
during a single evening. Similarly, in national newspapers or magazines, it is common
to see rival brands advertised next to each other. Alternatively, perhaps all these occur-
rences are just simple coincidences and brewers possess their own advertising schedules to
promote brands and attract specific target groups. Because consumers receive differing
advertising messages and are influenced by them, the outcome is the same as any other
form of retaliatory advertising strategy.
Diagram 1: In-built automatic retaliation outcomes.
Diagram 1 depicts the idea of automatic retaliatory impacts of rival advertising
investments. Each advertising message, which is specially designed for a specific brand
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has its distinctive function and is assumed to be non-retaliatory. Consumers who are
strongly influenced by advertising images and messages decide purchases which in turn
then determine the market shares for brands. Consequently, brewers see eventual market
share distributions as the result of retaliatory advertising, even when the initial aims of
advertising were under no circumstances intended to be retaliatory. This means that as
long as there is more than one firm advertising in a market, the value for R will always
exceed zero, i.e. retaliatory effects always exist.
Evidence from in-depth interviews with marketing executives from UK brewing, in-
dicates that key brewers do not normally intend to attack rivals by raising advertising
investments in response to rival advertising. Instead, brewers take a strategic advertising
view for each calendar year. This implies that an intentional strategic retaliatory element
does not exist in individual firm advertising. Consumers, who constitute the domain in
the battlefield, automatically transform advertising messages into competitive weapons
when they purchase specific brands. This implies that in a tight oligopoly like brewing it
is the ’chaotic’ competitive ’super’ environment facing business strategists, not the mo-
tives of firms which creates the retaliatory features of advertising investment in brewing.
Hence, the conduct variable is endogenous in the retaliatory case. To avoid confusion in
using the Schmalensee model for analysing strategic responses, the retaliatory element is
specified as a deliberate conduct variable in the subsequent analysis.
4 Empirical analysis
(000’)
Year ∗Actual Budget δBudget Budget Budget
nominal estimated by estimated by estimated by estimated by
budget Dorfman Nerlove & Schmalensee Schmalensee
& Steiner Arrow model model (3% model (3.5%
theorem refaliation) refaliation )
1987 1290 3443 4601 1523 1201
1988 1290 3424 4576 1514 1195
1989 1363 3436 4592 1520 1199
1990 970 3321 4439 1470 1159
1991 901 3722 4975 1647 1299
1992 1011 3903 5216 1726 1543
1993 1029 3843 5177 1700 1342
1994 1148 3800 5078 1682 1327
Source: ∗From A Regional Brewer In The UK.
Note: δThe values of r and d used for the estimated budgets are 0.25 and
0.5 respectively.
Table 1: Advertising budgets for a regional brewer.
Table 1 shows the results for advertising budgets using different model estimations,
Hence, the Dorfman/Steiner condition overestimates the optimal advertising investment
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for regional brewers in the long run. Comparing actual budgets with the Dorfman/Steiner
condition estimation, means that roughly speaking, there is an overstatement of £2
million in estimation differences throughout the study period. Moreover, the advertising
model of Nerlove and Arrow faces the same estimation problem. As the value (r + d)
is assumed to be smaller than 1, this implies that if other variables (PQ, EA, EQ)
remain constant, the final optimal advertising input (A) will be greater than that which is
estimated by the Dorfman/Steiner model. According to the estimations given in Table 1,
the most appropriate model to approximate actual advertising inputs is the Schmalensee
rnodel. Thus a regional brewer can monopolise local sales easily and the nearest big
competitors are not too aggressive in fighting in established local markets. A much lower
retaliation rate is therefore the expected result. This is consistent with the general belief
that regional brewers in the UK are able to capture the loyalty of customers who have
faith in local ales.
If we assume that the regional brewer has been operating with optimal advertising
capital, the retaliation rates should be between 3% to 3.5%. The estimated budgets are
shown in the last two columns of Table 1. Between 1987 to 1989, a 3.5% retaliation
rate underestimates actual budgets. This means that there was less rival retaliation in
regional markets. On the other hand, since 1990, this same model underestimates the
rivalry effects. For comparison, a 3% model is constructed to indicate that the rivalry
effects are underestimated for 1987 to 1989. Consequently, it can be concluded that the
estimated retaliatory rate of advertising between 1987 and 1989 should be between 3%.
and 3.5%.
Apparently, the Schmalensee model provides better estimates for tracking the em-
pirical findings. However, there are problems when forecasting the retaliatory rate for
advertising, which may change rapidly and fluctuate randomly over a very short period
of time. Frequent adjustments for R can be troublesome. The model also produces too
much stress on intercompany elasticities and neglects the real impact of brand build-
ing. If the original motives for beer advertising were not retaliatory, then an economic
analysis based on the Schmalensee model simply produces misleading predictions and
misrepresents the truth.
Most brewers believe in the cumulative intangible impact created by continuous
advertising. To create a more dynamic picture for optimal advertising investment through
time, an exponential component is included in the Dorfman/Steiner case. Normally,
industrial economists employ a simple single equation model to explain the influence of
advertising on all types of firm. For regional firms with dominant market shares, the
following advertising model was constructed to solve this serious limitation:
(5)
A(ert)
PQ
=
EA
EQ
Equation (5) includes an exponential function (ert); where (r) represents the rate of
goodwill accumulation and (t) refers to the time span of an advertising investment im-
pact. This model specification depicts a situation where a dominant firm is expected to
continue successful growth induced by its own advertising investment. Since the multiple
of (rt) is positive, if other variables (EA, EQ and PQ) remain unchanged, a lower level
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of advertising is desirable to maximize profit. Moreover, since (ert) is greater than 1,
this implies that as compared to the Dorfman/Steiner condition, this model indicates
that a lower optimal advertising investment is sufficient to generate the required impact,
both for present and future cases, to encourage sales to reach profit maximisation levels.
The variable (ert), is similar to a snowballing process, which inflates the present adver-
tising investment A into greater “future” values. The exponential variable implies the
influence of present advertising increases at an increasing rate which reflects neatly the
characteristics of dominant firms with a successful advertising strategies.
In a marketing sense, advertising is generally used to promote sales. The main
function of it is to stimulate consumers to try new products at introductory stages and
encourage repeat purchases in subsequent periods. If a product is experiencing growth in
sales, returns on advertising investment become higher. This means effective marketing
allows the use of a lower advertising budgets when the sales are at profit maximisation
levels. Again, this condition is considered in equation (5) which uses an increasing
exponential function to trap the growing future influence on sales.
Year Actual nominal Estimated Estimated Estimated
advertising budget∗ budget with: budget with: budget with:
(£000’) r = 19%∗ r = 18%∗ r = 15%∗
t = 5 t = 7 t = 8
1987 1290 1329
1988 1290 1321
1989 1363 1326
1990 970 940
1991 901 1054
1992 1011 1105
1993 1029 1088
1994 1148 1142
Source: ∗Data obtained from a regional brewer.
Table 2: The estimated budgets with different length of advertising impact.
Table 2 is a summary of the empirical analysis which serves to demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of model 5. Column 1 shows the actual advertising budgets of a regional brewer
which are assumed to be near optimal levels. A successful dominant firm advertising
strategy is employed here to estimate the structural characteristics of advertising invest-
ment, namely r (the rate of accumulated advertising impact), t (duration of advertising
influence) and A (the expected advertising investment) from equation (5). To simplify
the estimation procedure, (r) is set as a known variable with values equivalent to the
bench mark rates of return for project appraisals. In fact, when profit is maximised,
the rate of increase in advertising impacts should be equal to the chosen rate of return
for company projects. Based on equation (5), values of A are worked out by choosing a
duration of impact which produces a set of As closest to the actual As.
The bench mark rate for project investment changes from time to time. The findings
indicate that the required duration for accumulating advertising impacts are different.
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Between 1987 to 1989, 1990 to 1993 and in 1994, the estimated duration times are
5 years, 7 years and 8 years respectively. Shorter durations for advertising impacts
recorded between 1987 and 1989 are believed to be the result of primitive or inefficient
use of advertising investments. The longer estimated durations since 1990 could explain
the underinvestment in advertising by the brewers since then. The range of durations
estimated is reasonable and accords with definitions given in the long term strategic plans
of regional brewers.
5 Conclusions
The intrinsic significance of advertising in modern oligopolised industry concerns the
fact that long run strategic effects result from the interplay of market rivalries and the
inherent decay rates of specific advertising messages. That advertising be treated as a
strategic conduct variable is obvious from the forgoing analysis. Moreover, that strategic
advertising be viewed as our investment over time is necessary. The model developed
here can effectively track advertising budget mounted by an actual brewer over a run of
years. Hence, the plea in this paper is that advertising be considered within a retaliatory
paradigm. This modelling approach allows for intentional and non-intentional advertising
campaigns to be considered and relative impacts assessed in oligopolies. The variant of
the Schmalensee retaliatory model utilised here delivers a reasonably accurate picture
of actual strategic moves and counterplays in the UK brewing industry. Finally, that
advertising be treated as an investment in intangible assets is well established. That
these assets decay through time, explains the “paradox” that to some extent is seen
everywhere in modern industry: namely that advertising continues to increase in real
terms at industry levels throughout Europe despite the fact that the players themselves
might not perceive strategic investment in advertising as reactive or retaliatory in spirit.
The nature of the game in oligopoly means that pro-active strategic advertising by players
may through time be seen as simply re-active in long run market share terms. This
“paradox” of advertising in modern oligopoly is yet another version of the famous “Chain-
store Paradox” game.
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